At the biennial Global Nuclear Summit in The Hague this week ministers did not see their own policies as promoting nuclear proliferation.

But proliferators they are, just as ministers in the predecessor Labour government were.

It is part of the problem that underinformed ministers do not always recognise the the impact of their policies. But they urgently need to.

Perhaps they suffer from acute cognitive dissonance when pursuing their twin-track policies of nuclear promotion and nuclear controls.

This is a term used by social psychologists when "incongruent relations among cognitions (thought and understanding)... result in excessive mental stress and discomfort.

"Individuals who hold two or more contradictory beliefs frequently experience cognitive dissonance."

That's a rather dangerous condition for senior decision-makers dealing with a technology that carries the twin dread threats of major accidents and malevolent misuse by determined terrorists.

In January at Lancaster House in London the Home Office, supported by the Ministry of Defence, Foreign Office and Atomic Weapons Establishment, hosted a major international conference of the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism, which Britain co-chairs.

Home Office Minister James Brokenshaw noted that "the impact of a terrorist attack involving chemical, biological, radiological or nuclear materials would be potentially catastrophic. Our focus is to ensure that the UK remains a hard target for any terrorist.

"National security is the first priority of this government," he stressed.

Is it really? Brokenshaw said that the likelihood of terrorists obtaining a "functioning radiological or nuclear device" to attack Britain is "low," though he provided no evidence of this.

And he did warn that "the International Atomic Energy Agency's incident-tracking database records incidents of radiological and nuclear materials being found outside of regulatory control - and between 1993 and 2012 the trafficking database recorded 419 incidents of unauthorised possession and criminal activity relating to radiological or nuclear material.

"The availability of nuclear material could increase as more nations adopt nuclear energy."

The Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism aimed to "strengthen global capacity to prevent, detect and respond to nuclear terrorism by conducting multilateral activities that strengthen the plans, policies, procedures and interoperability of partner nations," the minister said.

Eighty-five nations are signed up to the Global Initiative, alongside four official observers - the EU, IAEA, Interpol and UNODC.

Britain had now developed a nuclear forensics capability which would allow it to investigate criminal acts involving nuclear materials, Brokenshaw claimed.

And he pointed out that nuclear forensics is just part of an interconnected picture.

Expertise had to be embedded and integrated into existing enforcement systems "to provide a seamless end-to-end capability for managing nuclear security incidents."

Keeping us safe from nuclear accidents would require co-ordinated efforts across government, from the Foreign Office "leading counter-proliferation work overseas" and the Department for Energy and Climate Change ensuring that "robust security architecture exists at our civil nuclear sites."

He went on to describe the Home Office's Cyclamen programme, which aims to detect the illicit import of radioactive material.

It sounds impressive - using a combination of fixed and mobile equipment to screen vehicles, containers, freight and pedestrians for the presence of nuclear materials and operating at points of entry to the country 24 hours a day.

But the problem is that while the Home Office pursues various ways to minimise the dangers from and impact of failures in nuclear security, the Department for Energy and Climate Change is promoting the indigenous development of a new nuclear programme, with the attendant plutonium-based nuclear fuel cycle.

At the same time the Department for Business, Innovation and Skills (BIS) is pursuing the export of nuclear explosive materials in new nuclear fuels.

In so doing they are following the strategy initiated by the Labour government, which in 2009 published a document which claimed to "lay out a credible road map to further disarmament" but also proposed increasing the civilian nuclear trade across the world.

A year ago BIS published a suite of documents supporting the expansion of civil nuclear power in Britain and the nuclear export trade abroad.

The 128-page Nuclear Energy Research and Development Roadmap: Future Pathways document "assesses the needs and opportunities for nuclear energy R&D in the context of new build of nuclear generation capacity to levels required."

It sets out "R&D pathways" to getting nuclear contributions to electricity generation up to 75 gigawatts by the middle of the century - "equivalent to approximately seven times the current level of installed nuclear power capacity."

The perfect pro-proliferation model for would-be proliferators.

At the start of the year the Washington DC-based Nuclear Threat Initiative (NTI) published its latest annual report.

The NTI is a non-profit, non-partisan organisation dedicated to strengthening global security by reducing the risk of nuclear weapons being used and by preventing the spread of nuclear, biological and chemical weapons.

NTI published a table in its report that ought to set alarm bells ringing in Whitehall, whatever Brokenshaw's claims.

It assessed the nuclear materials security provisions of the 25 countries identified as having the technologies and materials necessary to produce nuclear weapons of mass destruction.

It placed Britain bottom. That should worry ministers. But they are fixated on promoting the growth of nuclear - and thus the risk of proliferation.

That way insanity and disaster lies.