A failing regime

DESPITE attempts to portray a unified resistance to Chinese invasion, in 1950, the Dalai Lama's regime was unable to muster sufficient opposition to the People's Liberation Army (PLA) as it moved into Tibetan territory.

Armed resistance was half-hearted and, in any case, Tibetan Khampa forces actively assisted the PLA.

Many, although far from all, Tibetans welcomed the new forces or were at least indifferent to them. Mao Tse Tung, a master strategist at his best, ensured that significant traditional Tibetan leaders were won over.

The Panchen Lama, second in the Gelugpa religious hierarchy to the Dalai Lama, became a crucial factor in this regard, acting as a bridge between the central government in Beijing and local religious and political leaders.

Initially, the Dalai Lama fled Lhasa for the border town of Yadong accompanied, according to one historian, by "hundreds of pack animals loaded with wealth and treasure to be deposited in Sikkim." Bickering among his followers ensued and numerous delegations, both Tibetan and Chinese, begged him to return to Lhasa.

In the meantime, delegates appointed by the Dalai Lama agreed a 17-point programme for the incorporation of Tibet into the People's Republic of China in May 1951. A couple of months later, the Dalai Lama returned to Lhasa, minus the treasure, to endorse the agreement.

The timing of the 17-point agreement is important. It is often suggested by the Dalai Lama's supporters that it was signed under Chinese duress. However, the Dalai Lama was not under Chinese jurisdiction at the time of its drafting and he could easily have chosen to travel into India rather than return to Lhasa. Furthermore, a seven-point secret protocol allowed for the return of the Dalai Lama even if he chose to go into exile abroad for several years.

The main 17-point programme offered an internal status quo on political, religious and economic structures. Only foreign policy and defence would become central government prerogatives.

Major Kaishar Bahadur, the Nepalese representative in Tibet until 1949, hinted at one reason why this was accepted. "Many of the monks, if they believed their system would not be disturbed, would put up no effective opposition to Chinese Communist influence. They would be principally concerned in maintaining themselves in power."

In truth, the Dalai Lama and his representatives agreed to the 17 points because they had no serious alternative to it. His court advisers were split. With the Korean war in full swing, some may even have believed that People's China was doomed.

Mao was aware that Tibet's elite would obstruct the agreement. His strategy was to postpone political and social reforms and leave the privileges of the traditional rulers intact in return for their recognition of the new political power in China.

"We must do our best and take proper steps to win over the Dalai and the majority of his top echelon and to isolate the handful of bad elements to achieve a gradual, bloodless transformation of the Tibetan economic and political system over a number of years," Mao wrote in an inner-party directive in 1952, calling it a policy "of uniting with the many and isolating the few."

A second principle guided the Chinese Communists, the recognition of the dangers of ethnic Han Chinese chauvinism in dealing with national minorities and groups within Chinese frontiers.

In a 1957 speech On the Correct Handling of Contradictions Among the People, Mao warned of the dangers of Han chauvinism and said: "Democratic reforms have not yet been carried out in Tibet because conditions are not ripe. According to the 17-article agreement reached between the central people's government and the local government of Tibet, the reform of the social system must be carried out, but the timing can only be decided when the great majority of the people of Tibet and the local leading public figures consider it opportune and one should not be impatient."

In 1956-7, on a trip to India, the Dalai Lama was again exhorted by some of his advisers to remain there and oppose Beijing. However, Chinese leader Zhou Enlai visited him and reassured him that Beijing would not force the pace of reform. Once again, he returned to Lhasa.

However, the possibility of peaceful, gradual change was undermined by the cold war. Having been unable to secure victory against People's China in a head-on contest in Korea, US policy took a different turn.

Speaking to a US congressional committee in 1954, assistant secretary of state for far eastern affairs Walter Robertson said: "Our hope of solving the problem of the mainland of China was not through attack upon the mainland but rather by actions which would promote disintegration from within."

Contacts between the Dalai Lama's supporters and both the US and Taiwanese, with two of his brothers playing major roles, had already taken place in the early 1950s. In 1951, secret messages from the US urged the Dalai Lama to leave Tibet, disown the 17-point agreement and, in return, receive military support.

From the mid-'50s to the early '60s, CIA covert operations trained around 260 Tibetan guerillas at Camp Hale in the US. They then parachuted back into Tibet for sabotage operations supplied by CIA airdrops.

Roger McCarthy, who headed the Tibetan programme for the CIA until late 1961, estimated that 35-40 airdrops had been made, comprising about 360 metric tons of weapons and ammunition.

A military camp for several thousand guerillas was established in Mustang, Nepal. Direct US military support for this programme ended in the late 1960s as the US and China re-established diplomatic ties, although the Mustang camp was only closed down in 1974.

In 1959, the Dalai Lama's own stage-managed escape was orchestrated by the US, as the website of veterans of the Tibetan separatist guerilla group Chushi Gangdruk www.chushigangdruk.org makes clear.

The postponed clash between the Tibetan oligarchy and the central government now erupted in earnest - 1959 marked a decisive turning point.